A bank's ability to geographically expand its market has long been restricted by state banking laws which prohibit interstate branching. In spite of these prohibitions, which keep banks from establishing offices that accept deposits, service checking accounts and physicall y disburse loan funds in other states, major banks have been actively pursuing out-of-state as well as international lending opportunities through wide ranging networks of loan production offices, correspondent bank relationships, and bank subsidiaries. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta estimates that U.S. banks had more than 7,000 interstate lending facilities in 1985 (Whitehead) . Due partly to this de facto form of interstate banking, legislators in states throughout the country have begun to establish a variety of forms of regional interstate banking zones.
Because of their size, the large money center banks of New York City have long been active in developing interstate lending as an important avenue of expansion. One facet of such lending has been to the agricultural sector of the economy. Some of the large New York City banks have been involved in agricultural lending for many years while others
The authors are Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University; and, Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. only recently have significantly increased their farm and agribusiness loan portfolios.
The large increase in out-of-state lending distorts reported bank loan volume statistics for individual states, The implicit assumption of the bank loan volume data now reported by the USDA (Amols and Kaiser) is that all bank activity occurs in the state where the main office is located. As the volume of out-of-state lending expands, the distortions contained in these data result in misleading market share performance statistics by overestimating agricultural loan volume in the state where the bank is located and underestimating it in the state where the loan recipient does business. For example, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, commercial bank market shares at the national level were declining. At the same time reported New York bank market shares were increasing (Table 1) . Speculation about the causes of the higher market penetration of New York banks focused on such issues as nearness to a large money center, the character of New York agriculture, structure of New York banking, and the changing competitive nature of the Farm Credit System. In this paper we show that the apparent increased market share of banks can be explained by increased out-of-state lending by large New York City banks, We first present the results of a mail and phone survey of large New York banks. This is followed by a recalculation of New York farm debt levels and lender market shares based on the survey data. Us. 
The Survey
December 1983 Call Reportsl indicate that six New York City banks each reported more than one million dollars in outstanding agricultural loans, These six banks were surveyed by mail with telephone follow-up. Two sets of data were requested. First, they were asked to list the percentage of their reported agricultural lending that went to New York State borrowers for each of the past seven years. The second question asked the banks to estimate the percentage of their New York State agricultural loans that were in fact agribusiness loans rather than "traditional" farm loans. The latter question was asked because such banks often do not make a distinction between agriculture and agribusiness in reporting agricultural loans. Three large upstate New York State banks were also surveyed to determine if non-New York State lending constitutes an important part of their agricultural loan portfolios, The nine banks and their volume of outstanding agricultural loans, as reported in the December 1983 Call Reports, are listed in Table 2 .
Responses were received from eight of the nine banks, The ninth bank stated that it was 1 Call Report is the name commonly used for the reports banks file regularly with federal regulators. Call Reports include the Re. port of Condition and Report of Income. These reports are made by the national banks to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, by State chartered member banks to the Federal Reserve Board, and by State chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, unable to determine its approximate volume of agricultural loan activity in New York State but, in any case, New York State loans were a very small part of its total agricultural portfolio. Given this response, it was assumed that none of this bank's loans went to New York State farmers.
It was clear from the character of the responses to the two questions that the data provided were estimates based on the knowledge of the respondent. The banks did not have readily available data that would allow direct calculation of the ratios requested. In all cases, however, the respondent was a person with agricultural or agribusiness lending responsibilities. Hence, their responses were believed to be relatively accurate. 
Survey Results
The results of the survey indicate that for the six large money cent& banks, only about 10 percent of the total reported agricultural loan volume was for use in New York State (Table  3 ). The remainder presumably represents loans made in other states.
Further, a large proportion of the agricultural loans made in New York State by the six large money center banks were made for agribusiness rather than commercial agriculture purposes, This error in reporting appears to represent confusion or disagreement about the definition of production agriculture as outlined for the Call Reports.
As it turns out, only about five percent of the reported agricultural loan volume of the six money center banks actually represents loans to New York farmers. Except for 1982, this percentage was quite consistent throughout the seven year period. Given the changes taking place in banking, the fact that this percentage is not declining is somewhat surprising, The agricultural loan volume of the upstate branches of those banks with upstate presence is apparently expanding quite rapidly. Since the responses from the individual banks were frequently based primarily on recall by the respondent, there may also be some tendency for the reported percentages for past years to be more like the current situation than actually existed.
Agricultural loans reported by the three large upstate banks were practically all made to New York State farmers (Table 4) . These banks generally did not report agribusiness loans under agriculture and all of their agricultural volume is in New York State, It appears that most of the current upward bias in New York State farm debt levels, resulting from inclusion of all loans to agriculture made by New York State banks, results from the activities of the large New York City banks.
Revised Debt Levels and Market Shares
Adjusting the reported bank agricultural loan volume to remove loans made outside of New York or to agribusiness indicates a much lower level of bank activity in New York commercial agriculture than implied by published statistics (Table 5) . Reported statistics overestimated commercial bank loans to New York farmers by $140 million in 1978 and that bias increased to $618 million in 1984. Reported New York State bank farm loan volume for 1984 was 131 percent above the actual level of banks loans to New York farmers. The largest overestimation occurred during the last three years.
When total New York State farm debt is adjusted to reflect only bank loans to New York farmers, a considerable portion of the precipitous decline in equity that had been observed over the 1978-84 period disappears (Table 6 ). The corrected debt levels indicate a decline in equity for New York farmers from 82 to 78 percent, These levels are consistent with the 83 to 79 percent decline experienced nationwide (USDA, 1984) .
The revised market share data (Table 7) show two basic differences from market shares based on reported data (Table 1) . First, the commercial bank market share is considerably below the level implied by reported data. Market share percentage drops from the 30s and 40s, based on reported data, to the 20s, based on adjusted data. In 1984, commercial banks had only about 24 percent of New York institutional debt rather than the reported 42 percent, The adjusted data indicate a very high level of market penetration by the Farm 1984  650  56  9  32  5  1983  433  40  9  24  6  1982  276  41  15  28  10  1981  425  34  8  15  4  1980  292  33  11  11  4  1979  189  24  13  9  5 a Differs from "amount in New York State" due to agribusiness loans, -1984  60  60  59  98  1983  47  47  45  96  1982  46  46  45  98  1981  58  58  57  98  1980  58  58  57  98  1979  52  52  51  98  1978  53  53  52  98 a Differs from "amount in New York State" due to agribusiness loans. Credit System and a strong presence of the Farmers Home Administration. Second, the market share of commercial banks experienced a decline, rather than an increase during the 1978-83 period. Thus, the New York experience during that period was similar to that of all U.S. bankers. Both New York and the U.S. showed relatively consis-
Conclusions
Commercial bank loans to New York farmers are significantly overestimated in reported USDA statistics due to out-of-state lending and reporting of some agribusiness loans as agricultural loans by large New York City banks. Correcting for this distortion lowers the 1978-84 average New York bank market share from 36 to 24 percent. The resulting data also indicate a declining bank market share over the 1978-83 period, consistent with national trends, instead of the rising share implied by published statistics.
The corollary of the New York State experience is that agricultural loans in some other states must be underestimated, resulting in similar distortion, though in the opposite direction, of market share and leverage data. Further, other states with large banking cen- Since about 90 percent of the overestimation is due to lending in other states, more accurate reporting by banks, to include only loans for production agriculture, will do little to correct the problem. Modification of bank reporting on Call Reports to require identification of the states in which loan funds are used, or the state of residence of the borrowing entity, would allow accurate determination of the level of bank lending within individual states. The current movement towards more interstate banking implies that reported data will become increasingly inaccurate unless changes are made. State identification of loan volumes would also allow the Federal Reserve System to monitor the interstate flow of funds for both agricultural and nonagricultural lending, Interstate flows could be an important indicator of the efficiency of the U.S. financial system for many economic sectors in addition to agriculture during and following the likely irregular adoption of interstate banking by various states. If a change is not made in bank reporting, the USDA will need to develop procedures for modifying reported data in estimating state farm debt levels.
